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The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossi-
ble to define as those that mark a gentleman. And those who
need to be told would not understand it anyway. A sensitive-
ness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protec-
tion against the abuse of power, and the citizen's safety lies in
the prosecutor who tempers zeal and human kindness, who
seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional
purposes, and who approaches his task with humility.'
Introduction
It is said that a good prosecutor is one who follows the rules.
Experience, however, suggests otherwise. To be a good prosecutor,
it is not enough to operate within the terms of the law. Prosecutors
seeking justice often must go beyond the boundaries of the law in
an effort to create informal procedures for justice that will apply
where the law is silent.
This need for prosecutors to expand the pursuit of justice is evi-
dent in many aspects of the criminal justice system. For example,
consider a federal prosecutor's responsibilities in providing discov-
ery. Discovery in federal criminal cases is governed by Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and 26, 18 U.S.C. § 35002 and con-
stitutional doctrine.3 Pursuant to these rules, a prosecutor is obli-
gated to turn over only limited categories of evidence, such as a
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & William M. Rains Professor of Law,
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. From 1981-89, 1 was proud to serve as an Assistant
United States Attorney for the Central District of California. I am grateful to the
many ethical prosecutors who lit my path during and after my time of service. I am
also indebted to Jennifer Brown and Alan Heinrich, my conscientious and brilliant
research assistants. Finally, thank you to Kate Lang and the other members of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal for inviting me to participate in this important and
timely symposium and for their hard work in editing this piece.
1. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 3, 6 (1940).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1998), also known as "The Jencks Act," provides for release
of witness statements.
3. The two most significant constitutional duties of discovery are the prosecutor's
obligation to disclose exculpatory information, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
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defendant's statements, physical evidence and exculpatory materi-
als. In practice, however, prosecutors and courts recognize that
strict compliance with the rules can easily result in trial by ambush.
As such, the practice of many U.S. Attorney's Offices is to offer
earlier and broader discovery to the defense. That is not to say
that there is an "open file" attitude,4 but there is a recognition that
mere compliance with the rules, unless there is a compelling reason
to refuse to go further, may not be sufficient to fulfill the prosecu-
tor's duty.5
This Article discusses the undefined responsibilities of federal
prosecutors. For purposes of example, the essay focuses primarily
on five situations in which federal prosecutors are often expected
to operate "outside" of the rules, including: charging and investi-
gative decisions, discovery, plea bargaining, dealing with the press,
and sentencing decisions. While there are "rules" in each of these
areas, they take a back seat to the discretionary powers prosecutors
are expected to exercise wisely when performing their duties. In
judging whether there has been an appropriate exercise of those
powers, it is not the rules that will govern society's judgment.
Rather, the collective experience of dedicated and fair-minded
prosecutors sets the standards. It is only appropriate, therefore,
that this Article, as the others in this Symposium, be dedicated to
the memory of William M. Tendy, Sr.6
As the number of rules governing federal criminal actions in-
creases, so will the burden on federal prosecutors to judge how
they will operate outside the rules.7 Part I of this Article discusses
(1963), and information impeaching the government's witnesses, see Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
4. The courts have repeatedly recognized that neither the Constitution nor a
prosecutor's statutory duties requires open file discovery. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 422 (1995).
5. For example, it is standard practice in some jurisdictions to disclose witness
statements before trial begins, even though the law only requires disclosure after the
witness testifies. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b).
6. For many years, William M. Tendy, Sr. was a highly regarded prosecutor in the
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. Born in Ire-
land, Tendy spent his youth in an orphanage. When he came to the United States, he
led the fight for justice. To this day, "[1]egions of former Assistants and law enforce-
ment agents revere his name." Daniel Wise, Summation's Impact Cited in Capital
Case, N.Y. L.J., July 30, 1998, at 1.
7. For an example of the proliferation of articles that accompanied the imple-
mentation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gate-
keeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over
Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199 (1997) (discussing reins
on prosecutor's discretion to move for leniency when defendant offers government
"substantial assistance"); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the
WORKING OUTSIDE THE RULES
the role of the federal prosecutor in terms of what rules dictate,
and where they fall short. Part II provides an analysis of where the
law is silent, thereby making prosecutorial discretion imperative by
focusing on five scenarios in particular. This Article concludes with
a proposal of the factors a prosecutor should use in making such
decisions. Not surprisingly, they all relate to the goals of the crimi-
nal justice system: a fair and efficient judgment in each individual
case.
I. The Role of Federal Prosecutors: Can it Be Defined by
Rules?
Much has been written regarding the role of the federal prosecu-
tor.8 It has been said that the prosecutor wears several hats, repre-
senting everyone from the government agency investigating a case,
to the victim of a particular crime, to society in general. The latter
view is reinforced daily when the prosecutor stands in court and
states her appearance, "Jane Q. Doe on behalf of the United States
of America." This daily mantra reminds the prosecutor that she
represents more than just the investigative agency or individual vic-
tims of a crime. The prosecutor represents the people and society's
interests in justice in the case.9
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L. J. 1681,
1723 (1992) ("A prosecutor's options for including or excluding information can dras-
tically influence the sentence range and different prosecutors make different decisions
in different cases."); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (examining using equal protection to eliminate discrepancy
between sentencing guidelines for crack and powder cocaine).
8. See, e.g., George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L.
REV. 98 (1975) (exploring use of prosecutorial agency internal policy to balance the
need for consistency with the need for flexibility); Norman Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971) (examin-
ing research on prosecutors' psychology); Whitney North Seymour, Jr., Why Prosecu-
tors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REc. 302 (1956) (a prosecutors' description of how he
prepares for trial).
9. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Upating the Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 928
(1996) ("In the United States federal courts, the people are represented by an Assis-
tant United States Attorney."). Justice Sutherland summarized the prosecutor's role:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (19.35) (emphasis added).
In some U.S. Attorney's offices, prosecutors may convey a slightly different
message to themselves and others with their introductions. Appearances are made
"on behalf of the Government." Although just a change in words, the introduction
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Prosecutors have a general sense that they should seek "justice,"
but there has been no specific effort to define this role for prosecu-
tors. The primary guide for prosecutors - the U.S. Attorneys'
Manual - does not have a preamble inspiring and directing prose-
cutors as to how to seek justice, nor does it define the exact role of
the prosecutor. Rather, the U.S. Attorney's function is defined by
those rules that govern the prosecutor's behavior.1"
This role of prosecutors - as technicians who must follow the
rules - is regularly reflected in both the writings and speeches of
Department of Justice employees. Consider, for example, Deputy
Attorney General William Barr's letter in opposition to the Ameri-
can Bar Association's consideration of revisions of the ABA Prose-
cution Function Standards:
Prosecutors are first and foremost bound by their oaths of office
faithfully to execute the laws which the legislature has promul-
gated, in accordance with applicable statutory and constitutional
standards. They must also adhere to codes of conduct imposed
by their own executive agencies. Federal prosecutors must com-
ply with this Department's Standards of Conduct, and with its
policies and practices governing other aspects of the prosecution
function, such as the Principles of Federal Prosecution .... Fi-
nally, this Department has historically required its prosecutors,
insofar as is consistent with carrying out their federal law en-
forcement responsibilities, to conduct themselves in accordance
with the ethical requirements of those state and local jurisdic-
tions in which they are licensed to practice.'1
conveys that the primary role of the prosecutor is to represent the Government as an
institution which, in turn, is entrusted with safeguarding the interests of the people.
10. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE
MANUAL § 9-27.001 (Aspen Law 1987) [hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL]. A
copy of the Manual is also available online at the Department's website, and is up-
dated with greater regularity. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTOR-
NEYS' MANUAL (updated Jan. 8, 1999), <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foiareading-room/usam/>. This is not to suggest that all of the rules have precise
answers to the questions that prosecutors may face. The more frequent approach is to
set forth the factors a prosecutor should consider in making a decision. The overall
focus, however, is to keep prosecutors operating within the terms of the rules, without
regard to whether these rules alone are sufficient to lead to justice.
11. Letter from William Barr, Deputy Attorney General, to Sheldon Krantz,
Chairperson of the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA 2 (Aug. 2, 1990), quoted in
John M. Burkoff, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty Not "To Strike Foul Blows", 53 U.
Prr. L. REV. 271, 272 n.2 (1992).
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As of late, the fight has been over whose rules prosecutors must
follow, with a presumption that any such rules would suffice to de-
fine a prosecutor's role or guide her functions. 12
While following the rules is certainly an enviable goal, it is insuf-
ficient to describe for prosecutors what their function is in the
criminal justice system. This description of prosecutors as "rule
followers" presupposes that there are enough rules to guide all the
behavior of prosecutors and that those rules are specific enough to
ensure that prosecutors perform their role in achieving justice. The
description further assumes that novice prosecutors, often fairly
new to the practice of law, will have the judgment and wisdom to
evaluate cases and prosecute them fairly. Experience tells us
neither is likely to be true.
As comforting as it may be for prosecutors to think that all they
have to do is follow the rules in order to achieve justice, the reality
is quite different. Federal prosecutors must often operate without
the safety net of specific rules. 3 They must seek justice by making
the right decisions when gaps in the rules leave them with little
guidance.
II. Gaps in the Rules
In almost every task a prosecutor performs, there will be gaps in
the rules guiding the prosecutor's behavior. From selecting investi-
gative targets, to making charging decisions, to interacting with the
press, to making sentencing recommendations, prosecutors must
recognize that the rules will not guide them in all of their decisions.
Accordingly, a prosecutor's individual and independent interest in
reaching fair and just decisions is often the only compass pointing
to the right procedure.
12. See, e.g., Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act of 1997, H.R. 232,
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1997). The bill provides that federal prosecutors are subject to
state ethical rules and specifically addresses the issue of whether prosecutors, contrary
to state rules, can have direct discussions with a party represented by counsel. The
bill was strongly supported by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
bringing true Attorney General Thornburgh's prophecy that prosecutors could find
themselves following rules written by their opponents. This was evident in Attorney
General Thornburgh's press release criticizing the ABA's attempt to redraft profes-
sional standards governing prosecutors in which he stated, "[a]s a practical matter, the
rules are an undisguised effort by the defense bar to undo what both Congress and the
Supreme Court have declared to be the law." Joint Press Release from the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the National
District Attorneys Association 1 (Aug. 6, 1991), cited in Burkhoff, supra note 11, at
275.
13. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Prose-
cutors work "in an area where so little is law and so much is discretion.").
1999]
558 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
A. Charging Decisions
It takes a certain amount of proficiency with the rules before
prosecutors realize that their most important work occurs in the
area where the rules are silent - "in the gap." Charging decisions
are a perfect example. "The prosecutor's decision to institute crim-
inal charges is the broadest and least regulated power in American
criminal law.' 1 4 The guidelines for charging decisions are so ex-
pansive that they vary from office to office. 15 Moreover, the guide-
lines often depend on such factors as how one case compares to
another, or what the Department of Justice's current views are on
the priorities for criminal law enforcement. In fact, they depend on
so many factors that there is no one rule governing all charging
decisions. Thus, charging decisions take place in a gap in the rules
- a gap intentionally left so that prosecutors can tailor justice.' 6
In order to fill the gap, prosecutors must apply both a practical
sense of what is right and a moral standard. Practically,. prosecu-
tors must consider the likelihood of success if the case is prose-
cuted and the availability of resources to achieve success. Morally,
prosecutors must consider whether conviction is "consistent with
the public interest, ' 17 in conjunction with their personal sense of
the defendant's culpability for the crime, including the prosecutor's
individual assessment of the credibility of witness' testimony, the
accuracy of evidence and the need to punish the defendant for his
actions. 18 The prosecutor is indeed the gatekeeper and there are
14. Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the
Charging Decision, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513 (1993). See Charles W. Thomas & W.
Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507 (1976), for
an overview of the prosecutor's role in charging decisions.
15. The Department of Justice Guidelines instruct prosecutors to commence pros-
ecutions when they believe a federal offense has been committed and the evidence is
sufficient to convict, unless: (1) there is no substantial federal interest in the prosecu-
tion; (2) the suspect is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3)
adequate alternatives to prosecution exist. DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 10,
§ 9-27.220(A) (1998) (emphasis added).
16. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (prosecutor entitled to
threshold presumption that prosecutor acted in good faith for sound policy reasons);
see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (broad discretion af-
forded prosecutor because of the need for prosecutor to evaluate strength of case,
allocation of resources, and enforcement priorities).
17. Gershman, supra note 14, at 514.
18. For a more thorough and detailed list of factors prosecutors commonly use in
making charging decisions, see Thomas & Fitch, supra note 14, at 514-15 (1976).
These factors include:
1. The nature of the offense itself;
2. Prior treatment of similar situations;
3. The status of the victim;
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no rules defining whose name must be placed on the list of
entrants.
When the prosecutor's role in charging decisions is viewed from
this perspective, it is perfectly understandable why many U.S. At-
torney's offices, especially those in larger districts, do not entrust
the job of making initial charging decisions to new prosecutors.
Rather, more experienced prosecutors or specialized units super-
vise grand jury investigations and evaluate the merits of cases. If
deciding how to charge a case were as simple as reading a statute
and deciding whether its elements might apply to the defendant's
behavior, then new prosecutors who have demonstrated their aca-
demic acuity should be equipped to handle the task. Experienced
prosecutors know, however, that the charging decision is much
more complicated. The difficulty comes in evaluating those factors
that are not defined by statute, including the severity of the crime,
the defendant's role in the crime, the defendant's past and possible
future cooperation, injury to the victim, complexity in trying the
case and the likelihood of success. 19 Prosecutors must be able to
fill in these gaps in order to perform their charging functions.
The recent report issued by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr
regarding alleged impeachable offenses by President William Jef-
ferson Clinton provides an example of a prosecutorial approach
that mechanically applies the facts of a case to possible charges,
rather than screening those charges through the use of
prosecutorial discretion.20 Starr's report is only accurate if every
4. Caseload -demands;
5. Anticipated public reactions;
6. Personal characteristics of the defendant;
7. Recommendations of other criminal justice agencies;
8. The prosecutor's concern for his conviction rate;
9. The effect on law enforcement;
10. The prosecutor's opinion of the guilt or innocence of the defendant; and,
11. The likelihood of conviction.
Id.
19. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2117, 2127 (1998) (describing the broader policy goals that guide
prosecutorial discretion).
20. See Referral to the United States House of Representatives Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 595(c), Submitted by The Office of the Independent Counsel, H.R. Doc. No.
105-310, 1998 WL 614815 (2d. Sess. 1998) [hereinafter Starr Report]. In his report,
Starr itemizes every possible charge that could conceivably form the basis for the
impeachment of the President. Unlike the practice of most prosecutors, there is no
effort in the report to balance the severity of the target's alleged acts with the charges
being contemplated, nor to assess the likelihood of success on those charges. Rather,
much in the style of a law school criminal law examination answer, the Starr Report
itemizes and details all possible charges that could be sought against the President.
1999] 559
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
inference is drawn against the President and in favor of Starr's key
witnesses.2 '
The reality of criminal prosecutions is that jurors will rarely be so
one-sided. In making a charging decision, prosecutors are ex-
pected to anticipate the arguments by the defense and the ques-
tions of the jurors.22 The only saving grace of the Starr report is
that it is not formally a charging document. Rather, it is a report
that may lead to formal impeachment charges, which in themselves
have both a political and legal component. From the public's per-
spective, however, it may be both misleading and disturbing to wit-
ness a prosecutor blindly applying possible charges to a defendant's
behavior without analyzing the likelihood of success and the fair-
ness of those charges.2 3
Additionally, the problems with the Starr investigation and re-
port highlight another significant gap left open by the law to
prosecutorial discretion. Although most criminal cases are initially
developed by investigative agencies and then brought under the
supervision of a prosecutor, prosecutors also have the power to in-
stitute investigations.24 The law does not pretend to dictate when a
prosecutor may open an investigation. It is assumed that the pros-
ecutor will concentrate his or her time on those targets and of-
fenses posing the most serious risk to society.
It is therefore extremely troubling when a prosecutor, like the
Independent Counsel, is assigned a target and given the responsi-
bility to develop evidence of any criminal violations by that indi-
21. For a detailed defense to the charges, see Submission by Counsel for President
Clinton to the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representa-
tives, 1998 WL 856898.
22. As Chicago lawyer David J. Stetler, former chief of the criminal division of the
United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois noted, "If I had
received a prosecution memorandum like this, with details about the guy's marriage
and all, I probably would have sent it back to the assistant who wrote it and said,
'What are you doing?"' See John Gibeaut, In Whitewater's Wake: Lurid Details Aside,
Is it a Crime?, 848 A.B.A. J. 41 (Nov. 1998).
23. There is the additional concern that the Starr Report will be translated into a
criminal charging memorandum after the President is either removed from office or
completes his term and is thereby subject to criminal prosecution.
24. See United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (law enforcement
does not need reasonable suspicion or probable cause to target a particular individual
for investigation). The Department of Justice guidelines also do not provide specific
criteria for opening an investigation. Broad discretion is granted to both the prosecu-
tor and law enforcement agent in making this determination. DEP'T OF JUSTICE MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, §9-2.010.
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vidual.25 The fear is that the investigation will become personal
and that the prosecutor will fill in the gap with his own personal
goals in mind, instead of those of the overall criminal justice sys-
tem. The rules allow the prosecutor to do so as long as they are not
the sole motivating force.26 However, the unwritten law that exists
in that gap called investigative discretion, counsels to the
contrary.27
Given the trend in the law of search and seizure to rely on the
"good faith" of prosecutors and investigators, even in the absence
of strict compliance with the law,28 it is imperative that prosecutors
have an understanding of their role to serve justice. Assistant At-
torney General Stephen Trott counseled prosecutors when the de-
cision in United States v. Leon was issued:29
This landmark Supreme Court ruling should be heralded by
those of us in law enforcement not just as a victory for truth in
25. See Joseph E. DiGenova, The Independent Counsel Act: A Good Time to End
a Bad Idea, 86 GEO. L.J. 299, 304 (1998) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)):
How frightening it must be to have your own independent counsel and staff
appointed, with nothing else to do but to investigate you until investigation
is no longer worthwhile... [a]nd to have that counsel and staff decide, with
no basis for comparison, whether what you have done is bad enough, willful
enough, and provable enough, to warrant indictment.
Id. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J.
2267 (1998) (stating the Independent Counsel Act imposes harmful incentives on an
independent counsel thereby decreasing the public trust in government); James P.
Fleissner, The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute: Confronting the Dilemma of
Allocating the Power of Prosecutorial Discretion, 49 MERCER L. REv. 427 (1998)
(evaluating the future of the Independent Counsel statute in light of concerns about
prosecutorial power); A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent Counsel Statute,
49 MERCER L. REv. 453 (1998).
26. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
27. See Remarks by Attorney General Jackson, reprinted in 24 J. AMER. JUD.
Soc. 18-19 (1940):
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any
other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have citi-
zens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he can have this done to
the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled intimations.... [A]
prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of
some act on the part of almost anyone.... It is in this realm - in which the
prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or
selects some group of unpopular persons and the looks for an offense, that
the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law
enforcement becomes personal.
28. The Supreme Court's landmark decision in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
915-17 (1984) is emblematic of this trend. In Leon, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not bar admission secured by a search warrant obtained in good
faith but not in strict compliance with the law.
29. Id.
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the courtroom or "for our side" but more importantly as a sol-
emn occasion to reaffirm our faithful dedication to all constitu-
tional principles as well as the historic right of the American
people to be free from totalitarian searches . . . . As officials
charged with upholding all the laws of the land, the Constitution
is our sacred trust. I am confident that we shall avail ourselves
of this opportunity to demonstrate without ambiguity to the
Supreme Court and to the American people that we are fully
capable of discharging this duty.30
As Judge Trott understood, the vacuum created in the law by
Leon must be filled by prosecutors exercising their judgment to
safeguard the constitutional rights of defendants. Rather than
viewing gaps in the law as an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over the defense, the role of the prosecutor is to fill the gaps with
decisions and principles that are consistent with the fair administra-
tion of justice.
B. Discovery Responsibilities
Perhaps an even clearer example of a prosecutor's responsibility
to fill in the gaps in the rules is a prosecutor's duty to provide
discovery to the defense. Certainly, there are rules articulating a
prosecutor's discovery duties. The Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure direct the production of the defendant's statements, physi-
cal evidence, criminal records and reports of examinations and
tests.31 Constitutional doctrine directs the production of exculpa-
tory evidence,32 as well as information that could be used to im-
peach government witnesses. 33 Finally, the Jencks Act 34 provides
for the disclosure of pretrial statements after a witness has testified
on direct examination.
Irrespective of all these rules, gaps exist with respect to the pros-
ecutor's duty to provide discovery. Although a prosecutor cannot
be compelled to disclose statements by prospective witnesses prior
to the time prescribed by the Jencks Act, 36 many federal prosecu-
30. Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, The Challenge to Law Enforce-
ment of the Reasonable Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, Address
delivered before the Career Prosecutor Course of the National College of District
Attorneys (July 5, 1984) (transcript on file with the author).
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a).
32. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
33. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1998) (incorporated into FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a)).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1998); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a).
36. See United States v. Algie, 667 F.2d 569, 571-72 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that at
trial, a court cannot require earlier production of witness statements by the govern-
562
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tors choose to do so. 37 An experienced prosecutor generally un-
derstands that the trial will run more smoothly, and the trial judge
will be happier, if she ordinarily provides early disclosure of wit-
ness statements. Only in the most extreme cases, where a prosecu-
tor legitimately fears coercion'of a witness or concoction of a
incontrovertible lie by the defense, will the prosecutor deny early
disclosure.
Perhaps with the exception of individual office policies,38 there is
no federal rule that requires the early disclosure. Rather, prosecu-
tors fill in the gap by considering broader concerns for a fair and
expeditious process. "[P]retrial disclosure [redounds] to the bene-
fit of all parties, counsel, and the court ' 39 by expediting the trial,
reconfirming the prosecutor's commitment to a fair and open trial,
and avoiding a trial that is less a search for truth than a game or
sporting contest.4" To achieve these goals, the prosecutor must
move beyond the rules to a procedure that makes the trial even
fairer and even more efficient than the rules may have allowed for
in that case.41
C. Media Relations
As a prosecutor moves away from his or her role in a trial to
other prosecutorial functions, there is an even greater need for the
prosecutor to fill in the gaps left by the laws governing prosecutors.
Consider, for example, the rules governing a prosecutor's behavior
during a pending grand jury investigation. While Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e) prohibits the disclosure without court or-
ment in order to avoid lengthy trial delays); United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126,
131-32 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that it is not within trial judge's discretion to order
pretrial disclosure of statements earlier than the prescribed time). But see United
States v. Blackburn, 9 F.3d 353, 357-58 (5th Cir.'1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 830
(1994) (holding that it is within the district court's discretion to order production of
witness statements before the witness testifies).
37. See United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 773 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating the
prevailing practice by prosecutors of delivering "Jencks material" to the defense
before the conclusion of direct examination to allow the defense time to study the
disclosures).
38. See, e.g., Algie, 667 F.2d at 571-72-(noting the policy of the United States At-
torney for the Eastern District of Kentucky to advance disclosure of Jencks Act
materials to defendants).
39. Percevault, 490 F.2d at 132.
40. See United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 1.980).
41. Of course, there are often added practical benefits for prosecutors providing
early discovery. Early reaction by defense counsel to that discovery may reveal weak-
nesses in the prosecution's case. Additionally, the prosecution will gain a reputation
with both the defense and trial judge as an advocate more interested in winning the
case on its merits than in using procedural rules to best the opposing counsel.
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der of matters occurring before a grand jury,42 the disclosure of
information regarding other investigative matters is left to the dis-
cretion of the supervising federal prosecutor.4 3
This year, the issue arose in the Starr investigation as to whether
it was appropriate for Independent Counsel Starr to reveal to re-
porters the content of pre-grand jury interviews with grand jury
witnesses. In defense of his decision to review such interviews, In-
dependent Counsel Starr took the position that the rules techni-
cally did not cover matters occurring before the witness entered
the grand jury and that his revelations were designed to ensure that
the public had a fair image of his investigation and his
investigators."
The uproar from Starr's revelation was due, in large part, to a
recognition that a prosecutor has an obligation to fill in the gaps in
the rules in a manner consistent with a prosecutor's overall com-
mitment to seeking justice and providing a fair process to the target
of an investigation. Thus, if revelation of a pre-grand jury inter-
view would prejudice the defendant in the same manner as revela-
tion of the actual grand jury transcripts, it is the prosecutor's duty
to fill in the gap left by Rule 6(e).4 5
D. Forfeitures
While there has been a general cry for more rules to guide or
limit prosecutorial discretion, 46 the continual development of crim-
inal law and procedure often creates the need for prosecutors to
exercise increased discretion in realms where the laws have re-
mained silent. A prime example is the Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in United States v. Bajakajian.47 In Bajakajian, the Court
faced a challenge to a seizure under the current forfeiture laws.
42. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
43. In order to fill in the gap, the Department of Justice has adopted its own
guidelines regarding disclosure of matters relating to ongoing investigations. See
DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 10, § 1-7.530. The guidelines caution that, in
general, federal prosecutors shall not reveal information regarding an ongoing investi-
gation. See id. § 1-7.530(a). However, the rules eventually leave it to the individual
prosecutor, with the approval of supervisors, to decide whether there should be dis-
closure. See id. § 1-7.530(b).
44. See Karen Gullo, Starr Says Some Leaks Not Violation, AP REP., Jan. 6, 1999.
45. See Lombardo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Service, 99 T.C. 342 (1992)
(recorded interview of potential grand jury witness should be treated like grand jury
material). See also Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on
the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 1998 WL 856898.
46. See generally James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981).
47. 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
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Prosecutors argued that the "rules" governed and that because full
forfeiture was authorized by the statute, the forfeiture should be
upheld.48
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held the seizure to
be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against "Excessive Fines. '49 In order to be constitutional, prosecu-
tors would have to limit their seizure to some lesser amount - not
prescribed by the rules - that would not be grossly disproportion-
ate to the crime committed.5 ° In essence, prosecutors must use
their discretion to fill in the gap between what is statutorily author-
ized and what is constitutionally permitted. As in Bajakajian,
where there was insufficient evidence that the money was linked to
an illegal source, prosecutors have a responsibility of moderating
the forfeiture they seek.5 ' In other words, the prosecutors and the
courts have a constitutional duty to tailor the forfeiture to the ac-
tual violation that occurred, despite the failure of the forfeiture
laws to expressly state such a limit.
E. Sentencing Guidelines
Finally, there are laws that are drafted to intentionally give the
prosecutor - and the prosecutor alone - the responsibility to de-
cide what would be the just exercise of the law. While the formal
act of sentencing rests with the court, a prosecutor's charging deci-
sions very much will dictate what the judge's options are at the
time of sentencing.52
48. The Government sought forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), which
provides that a person convicted of willfully transporting more than $10,000 in cur-
rency without complying with the Customs reporting requirements, 31 U.S.C.
§ 5316(a)(1)(A), shall forfeit "any property ... involved in such an offense." Defend-
ant Bajakajian was found to have transported $357,144. "The district court found
[that Bajakajian's] violation was unrelated to any other illegal activities [and] the
money was ... to be used to repay a lawful debt." See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328.
49. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
50. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 326-28.
51. As pointed out by the dissent, prosecutors suspected that the money was
linked to illegal activities, but had insufficient evidence to convince the district court
of that fact. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
52. Sentencing determinations in federal court are made through the use of the
United States Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines. In calculating
sentences under the guidelines, the courts are guided primarily by the defendant's
offense level and criminal history. By selecting which charges the defendant will face,
the prosecutor has considerable influence over the guideline range the defendant will
face if convicted.
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Additionally, embedded in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is
Rule 5K1.1 which explicitly provides that it is the federal prosecu-
tor who must decide if a downward departure from the guidelines
is warranted for substantial assistance to the authorities. 3 The
prosecutor's decision is subject to review by the courts, but only if
refusal to file a substantial assistance motion was based on an un-
constitutional motive or not rationally related to any legitimate
government end.54 Otherwise, it is up to the prosecutor to deter-
mine what serves a "legitimate government end."55 A prosecutor's
decision as to whether to recommend a downward departure for
substantial assistance is guided, in large part, by the prosecutor's
personal evaluation of the defendant's assistance and its value to
the prosecutor's case. This decision making process requires judg-
ment - judgment gleaned from a prosecutor's experience and
good faith willingness to evaluate a defendant's attempt to provide
cooperation.
Finally, prosecutors, in making an initial charging decision, are
entrusted with whether the defendant will be charged with an of-
fense that carries a mandatory sentence. Certainly, there are De-
partment of Justice guidelines that encourage prosecutors to seek
severe sentences, but only those that are "consistent with the na-
ture of the defendant's conduct."56 Thus, it is up to the prosecutor
to fill the gap left by these guidelines - the determination of what
punishment, if there is a conviction, would fit the defendant's
crime.
F. Summary
As demonstrated by these brief examples, the laws intentionally
and unintentionally create gaps that are designed to be filled by
prosecutorial discretion. Although efforts are continuously made,
53. Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1 provides, in pertinent part: "Upon mo-
tion of the government stating that the' defendant has provided substantial assistance
in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense,
the court may depart from the guidelines." See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COM-
MISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING. GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (1998).
54. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 184-85 (1992) (the Government has
the power, but not the duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially
assisted).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
the government's decision that the defendant was not entitled to motion because he
had not been candid in his cooperation was not subject to review); United States v.
Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that the government need not make
motion when it determines for cost-benefit reasons that motion is unwarranted).
56. DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 10, § 9-27.310(A) (1997).
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it is likely futile, and most likely foolish, to try to fill the gaps with
hard and fast rules.57 The reason that it would be futile is that in
any given case it is often the prosecutor who possesses the informa-
tion that can lead to the fairest and most expeditious decision. 58
Moreover, the mere fact that there is a rule governing the prosecu-
tor's behavior does not mean that the rule alone will guarantee
compliance with it. Often, rules are recognized that carry so little
remedy that a prosecutor can violate the rule with relatively little
consequence.59 Finally, there are so many prosecutorial functions
that, unless one has a crystal ball, we may still end up making rules
ad hoc in response to individual situations.6
The reason that it is harmful to try to legislatively or judicially fill
the gaps is that prosecutors might actually start to see themselves
as mere administrators and forget the commitment that they too
must have toward achieving a just result. The daily exercise of dis-
cretion reminds prosecutors of what is at stake:' not just their win
record, but the credibility of the justice system and justice for the
defendant, the victim, and the public. As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. so wisely warned, "[the law] cannot be dealt with as if
it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathe-
matics."'6 1 Anyone who thinks they are going to find the "right"
answer to all prosecutorial questions just by reading the rules will
be sorely disappointed and dangerously off track.
57. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY IN-
QUIRY 43 (1969) ("To fix as the goal the elimination of all discretion on all subjects
would be utter insanity.").
58. "Discretion is a tool, indispensable for individualization of justice .... Rules
alone, untempered by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern gov-
ernment and of modem justice. Discretion is our principal source of creativeness in
government and in law." Id. at 25.
59. A commonly complained about example of this is the prosecutor's duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence. Unless the defendant can demonstrate the prejudicial
effect of the prosecutor's actions, the defendant has no remedy. Therefore, the rules
do little to ensure prosecutorial compliance with the rules. See. Richard A. Rosen,
Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65
N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987) (indicating only nine cases exist where discipline even consid-
ered for Brady misconduct).
60. See, e.g., Rita M. Glavin, Prosecutors Who Disclose Prosecutorial Information
for Literary or Media Purposes: What About the Duty of Confidentiality?, 63 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1809 (1995) (proposing a rule for prosecutors wishing to write books
about high-profile cases).
61. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co.
1923) (1881).
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Conclusion and Proposal
Ironically, engraved in stone on the Department of Justice Build-
ing in Washington, D.C., on the Pennsylvania Avenue side, are the
words, "Where law ends tyranny begins." As Kenneth Culp Davis
noted almost thirty years ago, "Where law ends tyranny need not
begin. Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of dis-
cretion may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or
injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness. 62
The goal of our justice system is to provide enough guidance,
structure and checks and balances to ensure that when prosecutors
fill in the gaps in the law, they do so in the way most likely to
achieve justice. Professor Davis named the principal ingredients
for proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion as facts, values and
influences. 63 Yet, as he recognized, such decisions are generally in-
tuitive. How, then, can we instill in prosecutors the values and in-
fluences necessary to ensure that they will properly analyze the
facts and achieve a result as good or better than that which would
result if there had been a specific rule on point?
The following are some suggestions:64
(1) Hire the right people. Typically, United States Attorney's
Offices have been able to be selective in their hiring of new attor-
neys. Yet, one wonders whether the hunt for smart, aggressive
young prosecutors has overlooked an evaluation of their commit-
ment to justice, including zealous protection of the defendant's
right to a fair trial. Far too often, young prosecutors join an office
with a "conviction psychology" which is best captured in the state-
ment, "I am engaged in a crusade to stop this great avalanche of
crime before it takes over all of us without our even knowing what
happened. 65
The challenge is in finding would-be prosecutors who want to
serve in a role different from that of a traditional advocate. Poten-
tial prosecutors must be evaluated not only for their skill in win-
ning cases, but also for their ability and judgment in filling in the
gaps left in the law with decisions that will serve both sides' search
for justice.66
62. DAVIs, supra note 57, at 3.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Of course, I do not stand alone in making these suggestions. Those familiar
with the operations of United States Attorney's Office have suggested the same. See
Lynch, supra note 19.
65. Felkenes, supra note 8, at 107.
66. In this regard, a great deal of the responsibility of "filling the gaps" in the laws
lies with the senior prosecutors who select new prosecutors and train them. ABA
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(2) Train the People Right. "Trial by fire" is the training for
most federal prosecutors. Assigned a case and someone to super-
vise her, the prosecutor learns by making those decisions that are
part and parcel of handling a case. There is ordinarily very little
time for the prosecutor to evaluate those decisions that were made
during the handling of a case. Both the volume of cases and the
quick pace at which they develop often force prosecutors to make
quick decisions that must be based in some part on correct instincts
regarding the application of the laws.
It is crucial for young prosecutors to have the time to rethink
their decisions and evaluate how they would make the decision in
the next case. There must be an opportunity to seek guidance from
prosecutors who are experienced in making such decisions. Finally,
there must be a constant review of the decisions young prosecutors
make and the propriety of such decisions. Without such proce-
dures, some prosecutors are likely to be guided by the experience
of what they were able to get away with, rather than what would
have been the right decision under the same or similar
circumstances.
(3) Establish tolerable inconsistency. It has long been believed
that maximum fairness will be achieved by neutral rules and stan-
dards to guide prosecutors' exercise of discretion.67 Yet, there is a
danger to formalizing the decision making process with guidelines
and internal policies. The danger is that these policies will not be
regularly reviewed by those serving on the front lines and regularly
implementing these guidelines.
Experience teaches that both prosecutors and defense counsel
can become dangerously resigned to following rules in which they
do not believe, simply because the rules are so entrenched and the
lawyers are so busy that it does not seem worth the effort to seek to
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Func-
tion Standard 3-1.2 (1992) ("Prosecution Function" generally) provide helpful gui-
dance as to the qualities to look for in potential prosecutors. They include a
prosecutor who understands that it is part of a prosecutor's responsibilities to: admin-
ister justice, exercise sound discretion, seek justice (not merely to convict), seek to
reform and improve the administration of justice, remedy inadequacies and injustices
in the system, and "be guided by the standards of professional conduct as defined by
applicable professional traditions, ethical codes, and the law in the prosecutor's juris-
diction." Id.
67. The focus of many commentators has been on establishing consistency in the
operation of prosecutors. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 7. While consistency provides
a certain amount of fairness, a tolerable range of inconsistency permits prosecutors to
constantly adjust their decision making to achieve justice and neutrality in an individ-
ual case.
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overturn the prior practices. It is imperative that internal policies
be constantly reviewed to ensure that they do not suffocate a pros-
ecutor's ability to achieve justice, but instead give the prosecutor
guidance as to what path in the past has best filled the gaps left in
the statutory and court rules.68
(4) Remember the Goals of Federal Law Enforcement. One of
the problems for prosecutors trying to fill the gaps in the rules that
govern their behavior is that they rarely have a clear vision of the
goals of federal law enforcement. Sometimes the vision is blurred
because it is myopic. Prosecutors become trapped in focusing only
on the "crime du jour." For example, prosecutors have been di-
rected through the 1980s and 1990s to pursue diligently the "War
on Drugs," the "War on White-Collar Crime" and the "War on
Terrorism. ' 69 While stopping each of these crimes is a laudable
goal, creating war-like environment for prosecutors institutes its
own. dangers.
As a soldier engaged in war, the prosecutor gives very little
thought to the pain and suffering of the enemy. Unlike in war,
there is room in the prosecutorial role for a prosecutor to turn to
his or her own conscience in making decisions. In joining cam-
paigns against certain types of crimes, there is also a danger that
the prosecutor will ignore other very real prosecutorial needs that
are less likely to grab the attention of policy makers or the media.
Certainly, priorities need to be set as to which kinds of crimes
should be prosecuted, but priorities should be subject to constant
reexamination. There is a danger in becoming too invested in a
particular type of prosecution strategy, even though it is not pro-
viding effective results. Finally, a battle scenario should be avoided
in prosecution work because it makes it psychologically more diffi-
cult for the prosecutor to make the concessions necessary to make
a trial more expeditious and fair. More so than in war, a prosecu-
tor can lose several battles (for example, over motions and other
evidentiary matters) and still succeed at her goal.
68. Many prosecutors may not be aware that the U.S. Attorneys' Manual specifi-
cally provides that individual prosecutors may deviate from Department of Justice
policy when appropriate to do so. It is important and required, however, for the pros-
ecutor to report on the action taken so that the policy may be evaluated. See DEP'T
OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 10, § 9-2.120.
69. For the corrupting impact of declaring "war" on an individual crime problem,
see John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War.: The National
Purse, The Constitution, and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557
(1991).
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Sometimes prosecutors have a blurry vision of their mission be-
cause they either fail to see or choose not to pay attention to the
efforts of other institutions, including local' law enforcement,
mental health officials and community organizational programs, to
address a problem. Prosecutors are trained to prosecute, not to
provide social remedies. However, remedies outside the criminal
justice system may be the best' approach to solving difficult
problems.
Finally, a prosecutor's vision may be out of focus because that
prosecutor is looking in too many directions and her judgment is
driven by logistical concerns rather than the fair outcome of a case.
A prosecutor's vision can be unclear because she is wearing blind-
ers - the urge to "win" blinds the prosecutor to the need to pro-
vide a fair process. A prosecutor must be taught to focus on what
really matters in a case - a fair investigation and trial of a person
who deserves, based on the evidence known (not just suspected) to
be punished for his actions.
Good prosecutors follow the rules, but they also do much more.
The tools for this job should be readily at hand and finely honed
through everyday experience. Common sense, an understanding of
the impact of their decisions on others, perspective and a commit-
ment to a fair trial for both sides of the case are of the utmost
importance. For federal prosecutors, these basic tools may be
more valuable than all the guidelines in the world.
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